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Faith Stevelman and Sarah Haan hope that last week's capital-market rebellion will cure boards of directors of their stock-market myopia

Business
Faith Stevelman and Sarah Haan hope that last week's capital-market rebellion will cure boards of directors of their stock-market myopia

By Faith Stevelman and Sarah Haan

Last week, a social-media-fueled populist rebellion gripped capital markets. Retail investors purchased huge amounts of stock in struggling companies like GameStop, AMC, and BlackBerry (among others). They wanted to make a buck. But, even more than that, they wanted to punish the financial elites, like hedge funds, that had been betting on the companies’ decline.

The punishment worked: on January 27, investors that had taken short positions on GameStop lost $14.3 billion. But the real story is not who lost (or made) money in a series of stock trades. It is that the prevailing model of modern corporate governance is on the brink of a seismic change.

In the current model, a firm’s board of directors exercises ultimate authority over the corporation. The board is responsible for hiring, evaluating, compensating, and, if necessary, firing the CEO and other top management, and its members must approve all other fundamental decisions.

To assess managers’ performance, boards have long relied primarily on the stock price. Now, that measure is failing. Evidence is mounting that stock prices aren’t reliable metrics of firms’ performance or the quality of their leadership. Assumptions at the heart of hands-off board leadership may have been right in theory, but wrong in the real world. By purchasing huge amounts of stock in ailing companies, ordinary people, trading online from their sofas, drove up these firms’ share prices, regardless of financial fundamentals, like revenue and profitability.

While the GameStop affair may be the strangest recent evidence of “post-truth” capital markets, it is hardly the first. In the early 2000s, it was revealed that firms had adopted a “fake it till you make it” approach – massaging their financial statements to boost stock prices.

And then there was the 2008 global financial crisis, which erupted after the collapse of a subprime mortgage bubble in the United States. Afterward, in the “flash crash” of 2010, the Dow Jones Industrial Average plummeted nearly 1,000 points in a matter of minutes, partly because of the actions of one high-frequency trader.

Add to that the GameStop turmoil, and it seems clearer than ever that America’s decades-long experiment with stock-based corporate governance has failed. That is a good thing: with the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that this approach amounted to an abnegation of private-sector leadership.

With their eyes trained on rising stock prices, corporate boards have overwhelmingly failed to prepare for – or perhaps even to recognise – emerging threats to their firms’ success and to overall prosperity. These threats include climate change, the scourge of racial and gender discrimination, and skyrocketing income and wealth inequality (a likely driver of the GameStop rebellion).

The COVID-19 crisis exemplifies the problem. For decades, companies had eagerly embraced far-flung, insecure supply chains. They made no preparations for a pandemic, despite experts’ warnings that one was inevitable. Their stock prices didn’t reflect the risks; on the contrary, they benefited from the higher profit margins. So, when the pandemic erupted, companies mostly didn’t know what to do.

Likewise, before then-US President Donald Trump’s supporters stormed the US Capitol on January 6 – an insurrection in which five people died – corporate political action committees poured money into the coffers of the Republican Party and its propagandists, such as Fox News. It didn’t matter that Republican politicians and media were amplifying the baseless claims of electoral fraud that Trump was using to rile up his base. With stock prices strong, the rising risk of radical US political polarisation – even domestic right-wing terrorism, with its potential for economic disruption – was not on boards’ radars.

It is time for corporate directors to abandon their stock-market myopia and renounce passive leadership. This means acknowledging the disruptive changes underway, engaging more fully with executives and workers, developing more holistic, forward-looking strategies, and marshaling their firms’ human and capital resources to advance them. Simply put, boards must own their legal power to learn, strategise, and lead.

New corporate strategies must be, above all, information-based and technologically enhanced. Fortunately, thanks to radically improved software analytics, boards can now reach into the depths of corporate data to grasp valuable insights and identify new questions. Boards are failing if they allow CEOs to capture corporate information and bias its presentation to directors. In just this way, some boards are already moving beyond the limited monitoring-board model and establishing enhanced information and communication processes to evaluate risks and opportunities more three-dimensionally.

The emphasis on human, board-level judgment is also a rejection of futuristic takes on passive, techno-driven corporate governance based on algorithms. Data isn't a panacea, as evident from the social and political disruptions wrought by Facebook and Google. The key is melding better data from within the firm with candid, searching-board deliberation about how a changing world affects the firm's future. This doesn't happen if boards use stock prices as shortcuts.

With luck, the fall of the monitoring board will lead to a new national conversation about what it really takes to lead big companies, especially amid grave political failures. As board membership becomes increasingly demanding, individual directors will have to serve on fewer boards. This will open up the field of board-level leadership to new – ideally, younger and more diverse – voices.

Recent shocks may also strengthen alternative power centers. Bold institutional investors like BlackRock, for example, have shown a willingness to wield market power to help prevent climate catastrophe (though BlackRock’s large stake in Fox News suggests that it is less conscientious about threats to America’s democracy).

Last week, ordinary citizens responded to systemic inequalities with a populist, market-based campaign to disrupt the mechanisms of elite accumulation – and sent a powerful message about the need for a new model of corporate governance that depends on human, board-level judgment, not just stock prices. After decades of passivity, the time has come for directors to lead.


Faith Stevelman is Professor of Corporate Law at New York Law School. Sarah C. Haan is Professor of Corporate Law at Washington and Lee University School of Law. Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2021, published here with permission.

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11 Comments

Finance Capitalism vs. Industrial Capitalism

The rentier resurgence and takeover

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Excellent. The explanation of economics that ought to be the standard textbook view and teaching. I think his interpretation of Marx's work is the best around.

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Obviously no one rationally would want to buy at the top, and yet enough people do to produce a top. It is really quite amazing how time horizons and money goals can change when there are stocks around that are going up 100 percent in six months. Finally it all turns into a marvelous carmagnole that is great fun if you leave the party early.”
– Adam Smith, The Money Game, 1967

It’s fitting that amid the conversion of the financial markets into a speculative online casino, the most extreme short squeeze has involved a company that sells video games. From my perspective, what’s concerning isn’t the short squeeze, but the characteristics of the tick-by-tick trading data, which is remarkably discontinuous, particularly in the context of the high trading volumes we’re seeing. An actual two-sided market with this amount of volume would generally have continual back-filling between bids and offers. Instead, you see lines and angles that make intra-day trading look more like a polygon than a bar chart. The behavior smacks of a marriage between a short-squeeze and a high-frequency trading algorithm, which I suspect may be front-running and amplifying the impact of actual human order flow. I’ve been staring at price-volume behavior for 40 years. This trading doesn’t look right.

Skipping down the street hand-in-hand with the speculative extreme in valuations is the speculative extreme in leverage. Margin debt – the amount of money that investors have borrowed in order to buy stocks – is now at the highest level in history, not only in absolute terms, but also relative to U.S. GDP. Notice that spikes in the ratio of margin debt to GDP are distinct markers of speculative extremes like 1987, 2000, 2007, and today. As Jim Grant wrote decades ago, “The way to wealth in a bull market is debt. The way to oblivion in a bear market is also debt, and nobody rings a bell.” Link

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Audaxes....The Adam Smith quote at the start of your post and the Jim Grant one at the end are, IMO, equally relevant to the NZ property market. But of course so many people in NZ) simply look at the last 40 years to provide them with the illusion of safety. Unfortunately, many refuse to open their mind to correct and accurate risk analysis as it takes the joy of ignorance out of investments they don't fully understand.
I even heard TA acknowledge this morning that soon most will simply not be earning enough to save the required amount for a deposit. House price to income ratio is hardly rocket science.

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It's long been the case.

Banks will always look to maximise return on capital on behalf of shareholders, hence lending priorities will be determined by the asset class that demands the least capital and provides the most liquid collateral - there is a reason why the risk weights for sovereign bonds are zero.

Residential property standard risk weights can be reduced by implementing 'the internal models based approach'. ANZ has reported a figure as low as 27%.

Banks have migrated away from lending to productive business enterprises because the risk weights can be as high as 150%. Thus around 60% of NZ bank lending is dedicated to residential property mortgages held by one third of already wealthy households.

The number of households eligible to participate will inevitably diminish as the value of bank lending to this sector ratchets upward.

Bank lending to housing rose from $50,788 million (48.36% of total lending) as of Jun 1998 to $292,645 million (59.71% of total lending) as of November 2020 - source.

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"Evidence is mounting that stock prices aren’t reliable metrics of firms’ performance or the quality of their leadership." this is one of the more inane comments I have seen in an article on this site. I am sorry but for anyone who ever watched the share market this has always been the case. the share price is mostly an Emotional value. Air New Zealand's debacle when it bought Ansett is a case in point. At one point following that the share price fell to $0.20, but the entire business of just their Christchurch Engineering base was worth more at that time than the entire value of the whole company based on it's share price. The fact that the board so thoroughly screwed the airline without consequences, and the Government having to bail them out was shameful. Never the less there is always a large emotional quotient in any share price, which is why so often that the market is so unpredictable.

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Agreed murray, a company's stock price IS an emotion based figure (more so now with FOMO, TINA etc) Tesla would be a good example. Personally I think the article is wide of the mark regarding Boards and functions. Your AIR example raises a good point too.. Director responsibility and how shareholders can hold them to account (which I believe is next to impossible)

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I think it was Shiller who referred to it as "castles in the air". Again, it feeds off itself and can also be related to the current NZ property market.

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That's true karl, it's all about people's perception of future gain - very much a factor in the housing market currently. The stock market does at least give people an opportunity to make an informed (hopefully) guess on future earnings with the constant disclosure requirements and audited accounts. The housing market is purely emotion driven - either greed or perceived need, now so more than ever.

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Murray, you do realise that you have to consider liabilities as well right?

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It is very much an American piece of writing, it clearly identifies "immoral" actors and proscribes a better future where everyone adopts higher "morality".

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