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Economists in agreement the Reserve Bank will increase the Official Cash Rate again on Wednesday

Economy / news
Economists in agreement the Reserve Bank will increase the Official Cash Rate again on Wednesday
rbnz

Hot on the heels of the Reserve Bank (RBNZ) raising the Official Cash Rate (OCR) in July for the first time in over three years, a follow-up hike on September 2 appears to be on the cards.

The September Monetary Policy Statement (MPS) is out on Wednesday, with the RBNZ to reveal if its Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) has decided to increase the OCR for a second consecutive review.

Economists at ANZ NZ, ASB, Westpac NZ, BNZ and Kiwibank, the country’s largest banks, all expect the RBNZ to pull a second 25 basis point hike from its OCR hat. This will take the OCR from 2.50% to 2.75%.

It’s unusual to have this level of consensus on the OCR trajectory from NZ's bank economists, as there are often different views and hot takes when it comes to OCR forecasts.

Kiwibank chief economist Jarrod Kerr described the RBNZ potentially taking the cash rate up to 2.75% next week as the “second in a likely 3-step move to 3%.”

“They want to remove stimulatory settings to ensure inflation settles back down near 2%,” he said.

The RBNZ is tasked with maintaining inflation between 1% and 3%, specifically targeting 2%.

“We believe the RBNZ won’t muck around and [will] deliver their third move in October, and pause thereafter. We may disagree with the need to hike, but we agree that this is what the RBNZ have signalled,” Kerr said.

BNZ’s head of research Stephen Toplis said the RBNZ’s OCR modelled peak in its May MPS was 3.28% for June 2029. BNZ thinks the RBNZ will bump this up to 3.3% for September 2029 in next week's MPS.

“What we think the bank will publish and what we think will eventually be the case are slightly different. It is our view the cash rate will rise 25 basis points at each meeting until it reaches 4.0% in May 2027,” Toplis said.

In July, when the RBNZ raised the OCR for the first time in over three years, the central bank signalled in its Monetary Policy Review (MPR) that “further reduction in monetary stimulus” would likely be required before the OCR starts to descend again.

“Future OCR decisions will depend on the Committee’s judgement about how price-setting behaviour and excess productive capacity affect medium-term inflation pressures,” the RBNZ said.

Westpac NZ’s chief economist Kelly Eckhold said the bank sees the RBNZ being “equivocal” about an OCR increase in October, but it’s less sure about another cash rate hike in December.

“[The RBNZ] seems likely to adopt a data-dependent approach to determining whether to continue raising rates in October, given they will be close to the 3% neutral rate level the RBNZ often emphasises, and there is a lot of data due for release over September and October,” he said.

The neutral level for the OCR is the point where the RBNZ believes it's neither stimulatory nor restrictive for the economy.

“The strategy to return the OCR to around 3% by year-end seems clear and uncontroversial. It’s unclear that further increases will be required at every remaining meeting in 2026. The economic recovery remains fragile and significant risks abound. Care should be taken to not take the recovery for granted – especially while the improvement in the labour market remains embryonic,” Eckhold said.

‘Get on with the job’

Alongside the OCR decision next Wednesday, the upcoming September MPS will provide the RBNZ’s latest projections around economic activity.

Since the July OCR review, the two standout pieces of economic data it will have followed closely have been the June quarter’s unemployment and inflation figures.

Annual inflation, as measured by Statistics NZ’s consumers price index (CPI), increased to 4.1% in the June quarter, the highest annual inflation rate NZ has seen since it hit 4.7% in December 2023. The latest annual CPI inflation figure was above the RBNZ’s projection of 3.9% for the June quarter but in line with forecasts from bank economists.

The RBNZ projected in its May MPS that inflation would return to the RBNZ’s 2% target midpoint in mid-2027. The RBNZ is tasked with keeping CPI inflation between 1% and 3% on average over the medium term, with an explicit focus on the 2% midpoint.

Meanwhile, New Zealand’s jobless rate rose to 5.6% in the June quarter, the highest it has been for more than a decade, with 166,500 people officially unemployed.

The headline unemployment rate was above the RBNZ’s forecast of 5.4% in the June quarter, although on the other side of the coin, employment and wage growth figures were also ahead of the RBNZ’s projections.

ANZ chief economist Sharon Zollner said on balance, the dataflow since July had been read as “mildly dovish.”

“We expect the RBNZ to get on with the job at this meeting and the next one, but in a world of such extreme uncertainty, flexibility is very valuable. An OCR track that leaves optionality regarding the October meeting seems sensible,” she said.

“Flexibility is valuable, but it is possible that the RBNZ Committee would strategically prefer to make an October hike a virtual lock to reduce noise and simplify communications just before the [November 7] general election. If they choose that route, the published track will be steeper in the near term but subsequently a bit flatter.”

ASB is forecasting 25 basis points increases to the OCR in the September, October and December monetary policy reviews. According to ASB senior economist Mark Smith, if inflation pressures in NZ remain “stubborn” there is the risk that “more concerted” monetary tightening and a period of restrictive monetary policy settings will be required to deliver the RBNZ’s 2% inflation target on a sustained basis.

“Ultimately, the (highly uncertain) medium-term inflation outlook will determine the monetary policy path. This is, of course, conditional on a host of global and local developments which are fast-changing. We expect the OCR to end 2026 at 3.25% as remaining monetary stimulus is withdrawn,” he said.

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25 Comments

All the economists above are looking at lagging rather than leading indicators. In the last few months, credit flows have slowed, current account deficit is widening again, mortgage / business debt costs are rising, and Govt spending is not flowing as quickly as forecast as agency belts tighten ahead of next year's budget cuts. 

The early 2026 bump was a sugar rush that followed 6-12 months after these leading indicators were clearly entering stimulatory territory.

An OCR rise next week will accelerate the developing 'fallback' and put more pressure on prices than it takes away. Debt is a cost, like labour and materials. Mortgage debt is also a living cost and wages respond to living costs not CPI. Just wait for 28 anyone? 

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Yep agree. They need to treat the fuel rise as a one off, and it hasn't been as bad as expected. Excluding that there doesn't appear to be excess heat in our economy to cause inflation, not that i can see anyway. 

Not sure why everyone see a raise as a definitive. Seems like a good time to wait and see to me. 

We'll be fine in '29?

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I don’t think it’s a one off. I’ve seen shrinkflation at full speed in supermarkets and hospo the last month or so. The lack of cessation of the Iran war I think has seen businesses give up on hopium that fuel prices have come down and are now looking for ways to pass costs through. Many that have been building for years. So the RBNZ have no wiggle room on inflation and rates are way below neutral so they will have to be hawkish. It’s a perfect demonstration of the fact the monetary policy is obsolete. But it’s what they have to follow through with. 

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A higher OCR is the tough medication we must all take to stamp high inflation out. It may take another 2 or 3 hikes next year to rein in the bolting horse. There's no other choice. To ease or even hold the OCR at current rates would result in even more painful price rises. The RBNZ must hike to support our dollar. Otherwise, we face becoming a permanent high-inflation banana republic with ever higher borrowing costs...

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I would agree if inflation was actually high. But it looks like it will be 4% for a bit then come down sharply early next year once the oil price rises fall out. 

I suspect if the RBNZ goes on a tightening binge here they will be making a very embarrassing and costly u turn next year. It wouldn't be the first time they've lost sight of the future while focusing on today's problems. 

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This is a blind faith position.

Increasing interest rates puts pressure on prices and lowers demand. A low-competition economy with spare capacity can resolve that by increasing prices, reducing supply, and holding margin.   

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Your thoughts are interesting.  Over in the UK the central bank claimed that inflation in 2021 was 'transitory', in order to avoid hiking rates.  Inflation took off, reached 7% before the Ukraine war, peaked at 10% once the war was under way, then fell back to around 3% in 2024/25.  But rates rose to around 5% in order to quash inflation (from near zero), while the mainstream expected (read wanted) them to fall to around 2.5% once inflation was 'beaten', but to date base rates are close to 4%, and inflation stubborn.  This has resulted in a collapsed housing market, along with other pains, such as marginal growth, although there are many other reasons why UK PLC is in trouble

Looking back to pre-2008, the UK OCR was always held about 2% above the rate of inflation 'in order to keep a lid on inflation', so inflation 3%, base rates 5%, that is what many thought the natural rate to be. But...back then debt was much lower, and that I believe to be the Western World's problem - debt. It is also why central banks dance on the head of a pin and become masters in the art of fine prose.  

 

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You're assuming that the changes to interest rates made much difference to prices (other than assets) through the early 2020s. The link is tenuous at best. 

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So NZ OCR tracking towards a band high of 3.3 to 4%.

Its a warning to those holding large, speuvesting, debt burdens/mortgages -to get out of Dodge City, while your tattered and torn, debt gambling shirt, still covers some flesh.  This coming Debt Sunburn Season will be a doosey!

 

As Debt price goes up, assets purchased with compressing loan ability, must fall.  As sure as gravity weight, on planet Earth.

 

Still, hope springs eternal for the tenant farming, cash extracting Lords of the land...... the market bottoming, in this most epic NZ housing crash, is only 2 or 3 years away.

Then your enslaved tenants, can buy your unmaintained pile of sticks, at 4x DTI and world is good again. Happy days are back!

 

Then come 2030, we can all get economically flirty!

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An up mark for comedy with a point.

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One thing that is very different now compared to past cycles is that the neutral OCR may be neutral in terms of inflation, but its too high for any growth. Normally the neutral OCR is the sweet spot between growth and inflation. 

I guess that's the effect of stagflation. 

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I believe the problem to be debt, household debt in particular in NZ.  When it was 30% of GDP in 1990 (now 90% in NZ) base rates of 4-6% were OK, now they serve as a killer.  As comments below note, it will be a slow painful process.  

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Why bother moving interest rates up and down at all, if they're irrelevantly always set looking backwards? 

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OCR at 2.5 to 2.75%

Inflation at 4.1% official

More service operators increasing charges by 10%

Inflation is not dead.

Our central Bank has a mandate to control inflation.  OCR needs to be at 4% plus.

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The RBNZ does take some scant notice of the Taylor rule, yet not enough!

So yes OCR should now be 4% or higher!

Our major problem however, is the National milstone, of FAR TOO MUCH DEBT!

Yet dont worry, this Debt obsession horse, ridden hard by house collecting,  leverage monkeys, is being beaten out of them, by their asset prices collapsing and Central Banks hiking Everywhere!

Debt is a now a noose and its tightening!

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They are meant to keep it at 2% in the medium term. The fact that a war has happened and caused a one off spike in CPI should not change their focus on the medium term. No point looking in the rear view. 

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"medium term" is considered to be 2-10 years....potentially of significant proportion of a working life.

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The_Prof,

I think you would accept that the OCR is a blunt tool. Why is our inflation at 4.10%? Primarily fuel costs, plus domestic costs such as rates and power costs. Explain to me just how a higher OCR will cause any of these to fall? You can't? Of course not, so why suck more money from households already struggling? 

And you want to see it at 4.10%. Bizarre.

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Be going up.

The US treasury rollover is near due. Trillions are currently looking to be rolled over at around 5%. That will be felt globally as capital looks for greater returns, or just go to US Govt debt.

Submarines have a crush depth. So does debt. You need to know where your implosion point is...

 

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“They want to remove stimulatory settings to ensure inflation settles back down near 2%,” he said.

What am I missing? What is being stimulated now at the current OCR rate? The housing market is still going backwards-and that's a good thing-while unemployment remains on the high side. The factors causing inflation; fuel, rates, insurance and some foods, won't be impacted by a higher OCR, so what exactly is the point?

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Ah - the Illusion of Monetary Control: A Wernerian Critique of Central Bank Interest Rate Management

The institutional choreography surrounding modern monetary policy is highly predictable. A central bank, in this case, the RBNZ, signals a change to its benchmark interest rate, the Official Cash Rate (OCR). 

Plus a link to an article on this exact same subject that I guest-wrote for a LatAm geopolitical think-tank, many moons ago...

https://sovereignista.com/2024/03/12/economics-part-iv-interest-rates-m…

In response, a unified chorus of commercial bank economists steps forward to validate the trajectory, asserting that raising the "price of money" is a necessary medicine to cool demand and anchor inflation back to an arbitrary midpoint.

This established framework rests on neoclassical economic models that treat the interest rate as the primary steering wheel of macroeconomics.

However, applying the empirical and theoretical framework of Professor Richard Werner, specifically his Quantity Theory of Credit, reveals that this entire paradigm is built on a fundamental misunderstanding of banking, credit creation, and economic reality.

Far from an effective tool, interest rate manipulation acts as an ineffective, lagging indicator that shocks the real economy with cost-push inflation while structurally engineering an upward transfer of wealth to the global financial elite.

To understand why interest rate manipulation is a deeply flawed monetary tool, we need to begin by dismantling the orthodox assumption that it actively drives economic outcomes.

Neoclassical theory assumes that raising interest rates reduces borrowing, slows economic activity, and subsequently lowers consumer price inflation. Werner’s extensive empirical research, which tracks decades of historical data across major economies, demonstrates the exact opposite - interest rates are consistently a lagging indicator of growth and inflation, rather than a leading cause.

When the RBNZ reacts to historical data points, such as an annual inflation rate rising to 4.1%, it is implementing policy based on past economic conditions. Attempting to steer a complex national economy by tweaking interest rates is equivalent to trying to pilot a ship by watching the wake left behind it. By the time a central bank raises rates, the underlying economic impulses have already shifted.

Furthermore, orthodox monetary models entirely overlook the microeconomic realities of how interest rate hikes behave when they hit the ground.

Rate hikes act as an immediate penalty on the economy, functioning much like a sudden spike in energy costs. In the real world, interest is not an abstract dampener of demand- it is a direct business cost.

Most businesses rely heavily on credit for day-to-day operations, including working capital, inventory financing, and commercial mortgages. When a central bank increases the OCR, it immediately elevates the cost of production and overhead for these enterprises.

Just as a manufacturer must pass the costs of expensive electricity or fuel down the supply chain to consumers, they must also pass on the increased costs of servicing debt.

This dynamic triggers an immediate, artificial cost-push inflationary pressure across the entire economy, worsening the very problem the central bank claims to be solving.

For everyday citizens, this penalty manifests as escalating mortgage repayments and rising rents, which are non-discretionary living costs. As workers experience a severe squeeze on their disposable income due to these forced financial outflows, they naturally demand higher wages to preserve their standard of living, resulting in a secondary inflationary spiral that central banks mistakenly attribute to an "overheating" economy.

The structural failure of this policy becomes even more apparent when analyzed through Werner’s disaggregation of the money supply.

Werner’s Quantity Theory of Credit separates bank credit into two distinct flows:

(i) Credit directed toward the productive real economy for goods and services.

(ii) And credit directed toward financial circulation for asset transactions, such as existing real estate and stocks.

Productive credit creation generates non-inflationary growth because it increases GDP by expanding capacity, introducing new technologies, and funding business investments.

Financial credit, by contrast, merely pumps purchasing power into existing assets, causing asset price bubbles and banking crises.

When a central bank uniformly raises the OCR, it uses a blunt instrument that completely fails to differentiate between these two credit streams. High interest rates disproportionately choke off productive real-economy credit.

Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which serve as the primary engine for employment, find themselves unable to afford the capital necessary to innovate, expand, or retain staff. This dynamic is vividly illustrated in New Zealand's economic data, where aggressive monetary tightening has driven the unemployment rate up to a decade-high of 5.6%.

The policy eventually 'succeeds' (sic) in bringing down consumer inflation only because it acts as an economic sledgehammer, forcing the real economy into a recessionary state, deliberately crushing consumer demand, and destroying livelihoods.

Beneath the technical vocabulary of "neutral rates" and "monetary stimulus" lies a highly unequal mechanism of wealth distribution.

Commercial banks are not passive intermediaries that merely lend out existing savings - they create new money out of nothing when they issue credit. When a central bank orchestrates a high-interest-rate environment, it creates an asymmetric financial landscape.

Commercial banks are exceptionally quick to adjust their lending rates upward to maximise revenue from mortgages and business loans, yet they are notoriously slow to pass those higher yields on to everyday depositors.

This structural asymmetry facilitates an enormous, systemic transfer of wealth out of the productive economy and directly into the hands of a microscopic fraction of humanity - the financial elite, large institutional debt holders, and the banking cartel.

Liquid capital and existing wealth are rewarded with risk-free, compounding returns, while the working and middle classes see their disposable incomes extracted to service inflated debt burdens.

The consensus displayed by commercial bank economists regarding the RBNZ's policy trajectory reveals a financial system operating on an obsolete framework.

Central banks continue to rely on a tool that creates short-term cost-push inflation, damages productive industry over the medium term, and locks in severe wealth inequality in the long term. I

If a central bank genuinely sought to maintain economic stability and non-inflationary growth, it would move away from interest rate manipulation entirely.

Instead, it would adopt Werner’s model of direct quantitative credit guidance, instructing commercial banks to restrict credit for asset speculation while ensuring a steady, affordable flow of credit into productive, wealth-generating real-economy investments.

Better still, true systemic resilience requires completely reforming the money creation process into a public utility model. Under a public utility framework, the sovereign issuance and allocation of money are directly tied to public interest and real productive capacity, ensuring these macroeconomic fundamentals are, by definition, automatically optimised.

In practice, a debt-free sovereign money system shifts the power of money creation away from private commercial bank ledgers and onto a transparent public balance sheet.

Instead of money entering circulation as an interest-bearing debt, which requires continuous economic growth just to service the compounding interest, sovereign money is permanently issued directly by the state to fund tangible public infrastructure, scientific innovation, and real economic capacity.

Because this money matches real-world productivity and is not bound to a compounding debt-repayment mechanism, it eliminates the structural necessity for boom-and-bust cycles.

Taxation, especially in the form of a minuscule 0.25% FTT rather than funding government spending, is repurposed purely as a tool to regulate aggregate demand and permanently retire excess currency from circulation, thereby maintaining stable purchasing power.

Transitioning to such a system would render central banking frameworks like "Dah Fed", the 100% privately owned creature that crawled out of the 1910 Jekyll Island duck hunting expedition, entirely obsolete.

Rather than remaining the gatekeepers of economic life, these private-monopoly institutions would ultimately become nothing more than a quaint historical notion - stark monuments to a predestined-to-fail experiment in centralised private credit creation.... one that went horribly wrong.

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I think you might be right based on Co-pilots summary. Maybe if my attention span was longer I would learn something. From my experience pricing money too cheaply hinders effective market deployment of capital more than anything 

For others benefit;

The article argues that central banks place too much faith in interest rates as an economic management tool. Using Richard Werner’s credit theory, it claims that interest rates react to economic conditions rather than drive them.

It argues that higher interest rates increase costs for businesses and households. According to the author, this suppresses productive investment and can initially add inflationary pressure.

The proposed alternative is to control where credit flows rather than adjusting its price. The author advocates directing lending toward productive activity and ultimately replacing debt-based money creation with a sovereign money system.

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Hi, WinHonourHelp

Thank you for your honesty regarding the use of Microsoft Copilot to navigate the text.

The Algorithmic Shield

Your comment actually highlights a profound irony that perfectly illustrates the technical capture we are facing today. By delegating reading to a corporate artificial intelligence engine, we can unintentionally become a textbook victim of what can only be described as the "Loaded AI Filter."

Because models like Copilot are built on highly corporate, institutional frameworks, their algorithms are programmed to act as a sanitizing shield - as such, in summarizing my post, the machine systematically stripped out all of the raw, punchy, systemic vocabulary.

It completely erased any reference to the private banking cartel, Jekyll Island, "Dah Fed," and the operational realities of a global "wealth heist". By sterilizing a radical, structural critique into polite, safe, academic jargon, the AI rendered the thesis palatable for standard consumption, effectively protecting the very institutions being challenged.

The Textbook Neoclassical Counter Argument

This brings us directly to your textbook neoclassical counter-argument - the idea that pricing money too cheaply hinders the effective deployment of capital. Because the AI filter stripped away the mechanics, you are left arguing against a superficial phantom.

The ineffective deployment of capital does not happen because money is "too cheap" - it happens because of where the credit is directed.

Under our current Western-centric paradigm, a private cartel-monopoly of commercial banks create roughly 97% of our money supply out of thin air when they issue loans. Left to their own devices, private banks will always choose to create credit for financial circulation, speculating on existing real estate, equities, and derivative market, because asset-backed collateral looks best on a corporate balance sheet.

This is the true driver of capital misallocation. It pumps trillions into speculative bubbles that drive zero real GDP growth, while systematically starving the productive real economy of the affordable capital that small and medium enterprises (SMEs) need to innovate and employ people.

If money is priced cheaply but legally steered via quantitative credit guidance exclusively into productive, non-inflationary real-economy investment (the exact mechanism behind Japan's post-war miracle and China's industrial scaling), you achieve massive capacity expansion without consumer price inflation.

Conversely, when a central bank raises the interest rate to "fix" the problem, it doesn't stop the ultra-wealthy from gambling on existing assets - it simply chokes off the small, productive businesses on Main Street that can no longer afford to survive.

The systemic flaw isn't the price of the tool, it is the direction of the flow. The algorithm served you up standard textbook orthodoxies, but real-world banking operations tell a completely different story.

Nevertheless, I always appreciate a civil dialogue.

Cheers, 
Colin

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Be interested in your thoughts on the following.

 

Government isn't good at picking winners, how could we put faith in it regulating lending and investment more than it is?

Government should instead remove barriers to businesses, with certain protections on labour and resources.

China has a fail fast approach leading to many failed ventures across technology and real estate. The West has no appetite for that with a completey different risk profile. Any resulting uprising of investors is effectively supressed by violent means in China. 

China also has very very high price to income valuation on housing vs the west.

Japan has tough working conditions, and flow through of investment into productivity and wage growth has been poor. 

 

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Hi WinHonourHelp,

And yet again, you attempt to shift the goalposts.

We started with the specific macroeconomic and operational mechanics of central bank interest rate manipulation and bank credit creation. In response, you have fired off a wide-ranging set of random questions on an entire raft of political and cultural assertions. (AKA the "Gish Gallop" deflection technique),

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gish_gallop

I will not be drawn into an endless, circular debate on geopolitics - but I will correct the core economic error underpinning your questions.

You include the assertion that "government isn't good at picking winners." This is a standard textbook slogan, but it misses the entire point of quantitative credit guidance.

Directing credit is not about bureaucrats picking specific companies ("winners"). It is about setting broad, legal parameters on the banking sector - specifically, banning banks from creating money for speculative asset inflation, while leaving them entirely free to compete and lend to the entire productive real economy.

As I have repeated mentioned before, and it doesn't appear to have sunk in yet - when a private banking cartel is allowed to create 97% of the money supply out of thin air for financial speculation, they are the ones picking winners, and they consistently pick asset bubbles, mega-corporations, and the top 0.000035 percentile, while starving Main Street.

The empirical data and structural literature on Richard Werner’s Quantity Theory of Credit and sovereign money utility models are widely available online. I suggest letting your fingers do the walking through his published papers if you wish to study how these credit mechanics actually operate in the real world.

I will leave our dialogue here and let the analysis already posted stand on its own merits - my one suggestion to you, is that you learn to do you own research if you wish to be taken seriously in discussions on topics of this nature.  

Cheers,
Colin

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