Chris Trotter asks: If New Zealand can neither win, nor afford, to enter an arms race against China, then why not initiate a peace race instead?

By Chris Trotter*

Amidst global contention and confusion, there’s a scene in Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings that bears recalling. Against all the odds, the hero, Frodo Baggins, and his faithful companion, Sam Gamgee, have made it into the land of Mordor. What they see both astonishes and appals them. In spite of all they have been told about its power and might, the reality of this teeming hive-world is overwhelming. They quail at the prospect of challenging Mordor and its Dark Lord.

Confronted with the power and might of China, those framing New Zealand’s defence policies could be forgiven for experiencing similar feelings of dread and inadequacy. Unfortunately, and unlike Frodo and Sam, New Zealand is not in possession of a game-changing magic ring. Nor are New Zealanders anticipating the return of a mighty king, guided by a powerful wizard. Christopher Luxon is a poor substitute for Aragorn, and Judith Collins is no Gandalf.

Moreover (and at the risk of stretching the Tolkien comparison to breaking-point) the United States of America, which, prior to the return of Donald Trump, most New Zealanders would have cast in the role of the ancient and mighty Kingdom of Gondor, is becoming increasingly difficult to associate with the strength, wisdom, and moral clarity of Middle Earth’s venerable superpower.

Obviously, Collins’ Defence Capability Plan (DCP) was drafted before Trump’s tariffs upended the global trading system and pitted a bitterly divided and strategically vulnerable USA against the unflinching authoritarian regime of Xi Jinping. But, even allowing for the scale and pace of Trump’s changes, the measures announced by Collins, on behalf of the Coalition Government, fall well short of a coherent response to either the waxing powers of Beijing, or the waning commitments of Washington.

The 2025 DCP begins with the following observation:

“Our economic security is inextricably tied to our national security. For the future prosperity of our small island nation that relies on trade for its economic wellbeing, the movement of people and capital, rules consistent with our values, and trusted international partnerships to underpin our security, we need a clear pathway for sustained investment in New Zealand’s defence.”

But, it is surely a strategic nonsense to set aside $9 billion of new government spending to increase the “lethality” of New Zealand’s armed forces, in order to address the alleged geostrategic “threat” posed by the country’s largest trading partner?

How can New Zealand’s national security possibly be enhanced by announcing defence policies aimed directly at China? Is it at all reasonable to interpret policies with the potential to undermine New Zealand’s short- and long-term prosperity, as anything other than a direct threat to its economic and, by the Government’s own logic, national security?

Equally at odds with the new geostrategic logic of the Age of Trump is the DCP’s invocation of the “trusted international partnerships”, “rules consistent with our values”, and “movement of people and capital” that underpinned the era of globalisation – the erstwhile world order which, in just eleven brutal weeks, the USA has extinguished.

Even the DCP’s perennial emphasis on maintaining and enhancing the “interoperability” of the New Zealand and Australian defence forces is more a nostalgic reflection of their historical affinity, than a demonstration of compelling military logic.

New Zealand’s freedom and independence would come under direct threat only in circumstances arising out of, first: the defeat and/or withdrawal of the USA; and, second: the consequent capitulation of Australia. Were these preconditions to be fulfilled, it is probable that the most effective military units of the New Zealand armed forces would already have been destroyed fighting alongside their Aussie comrades, leaving New Zealanders to face the victors without effective means of self-defence.

Everything therefore hinges on the ability and the willingness of the USA to risk everything in the defence of Australia and New Zealand. Certainly, the authors of the DCP have framed the development of New Zealand’s defence capability in accordance with this core assumption. That were Australia and New Zealand to succumb to Chinese pressure, the USA’s dominant position in the Pacific would be fatally compromised – as would India’s in the Indian Ocean.

Hence the DCP’s focus on the Indo-Pacific:

“The Indo-Pacific is a primary geographical theatre for strategic competition, most visibly between China and the United States. China’s assertive pursuit of its strategic objectives is the principal driver for strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific, and it continues to use all of its tools of statecraft in ways that can challenge both international norms of behaviour and the security of other states.”

Except the prime global challenger to “international norms of behaviour” and the “security of other states” in April 2025, isn’t China – it’s the USA.

President Trump’s extraordinary alignment with the Russian Federation and North Korea in the United Nations. His open hostility towards America’s Nato allies. His resurrection of “spheres of influence” in defiance of the UN commitment to “collective security”. All of these extraordinary deviations from the post-war international relations template, undertaken by the leader of the “Free World”, have shaken profoundly the confidence of the USA’s erstwhile friends and allies.

Similarly, Trump’s utter indifference to treaties and agreements entered into by the United States: his arbitrary and unilateral imposition of swingeing tariffs on nations with whom the American government has negotiated binding free-trade agreements; his threats to annex Greenland and Panama; all offer scant evidence of the USA’s continued commitment to “international norms of behaviour”.

In spite of mounting evidence that they are living in a radically altered global security environment, New Zealand’s military and political leaders refuse to abandon the strategic priorities of an international system that no longer exists.

If, as seems likely (and as most economic analysts are now expecting) China stares the USA down, and the Sino-American trade war ends in a mutually satisfactory compromise, then Trump may simply shrug-off his diplomatic discomfiture by recognising the whole of the Eastern Pacific as China’s sphere of influence. In much the same way that he appears to be readying himself to toss most of Eastern Europe, Ukraine in particular, into Russia’s slavering jaws.

A more realistic defence policy for New Zealand – and Australia – would be to place themselves at the forefront of the current effort by South Pacific island nations to have the Pacific recognised internationally as a demilitarised and nuclear-free “Ocean of Peace”.

Rather than building up their armed forces to become “force multipliers” for an American military effort that may soon be scaled back, or forgotten altogether, Australia and New Zealand should focus instead on providing Pacific nations with much needed practical assistance in combatting illegal fishing, environmentally damaging mineral extraction, drug-running, and people smuggling. Both nations could also take a leading role in responding to natural emergencies, and in helping Pacific nations adapt to the challenges of climate change.

If weapons we must have, then let them be the latest, the cheapest, and the most effective – i.e. cyber-weapons and drones.

Because, if China is the closest approximation to Mordor in the Indo-Pacific region – albeit a Mordor that has made Gondor its key trading partner! – then an Anzac-backed Pacific Ocean of Peace is the closest Australia and New Zealand are likely to come to finding a magic ring of power. In Tolkien’s fantasy, Sauron, the Dark Lord, was defeated because he simply could not conceive of his enemies attempting to destroy his terrible ring rather than use it against him. If New Zealand can neither win, nor afford, to enter an arms race against China, then why not initiate a peace race instead?

There are moments in history when the very last thing your enemies expect, should be your first choice.

*Chris Trotter has been writing and commenting professionally about New Zealand politics for more than 30 years. He writes a weekly column for interest.co.nz. His work may also be found at http://bowalleyroad.blogspot.com.