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Japan and China to take a break; Xi to visit Trump; China FDI still weak; Japan hikes & moves to protect the yen; US factories slow down; RBA signals more rate hikes; UST 10yr at 5.00%; gold holds, oil holds; NZ$1 = 57.2 USc; TWI-5 = 60.7

Economy / news
Japan and China to take a break; Xi to visit Trump; China FDI still weak; Japan hikes & moves to protect the yen; US factories slow down; RBA signals more rate hikes; UST 10yr at 5.00%; gold holds, oil holds; NZ$1 = 57.2 USc; TWI-5 = 60.7
Breakfast Briefing

Here's our summary of key economic events over the weekend that affect New Zealand, with news global financial markets are little-changed at near historic highs even though economic data releases seem to be still giving weaker signals.

This week will be dominated by the Fonterra annual result and dairy payout finalisation, a big dump of RBNZ lending data, and some credit card activity data.

In Australia, the week will be headlined by the August jobs data release which is expected to show +20,000 jobs growth.

Elsewhere, China is heading into its Mid-Autumn Festival which starts on Friday and runs through to Sunday.

In Japan it will be Silver Week with markets closed there today through Wednesday.

China made no changes to their Loan Prime Rates over the weekend. Ahead this week there will be many such decisions in Switzerland (no change at 0%), Sweden (no change at 1.75%), Norway (no change at 4.25%), Mexico (no change at 6.5%), and Indonesia (no change at 5.75%).

And there will be a major diplomatic set piece this week with Chinese President Xi visiting the US on Friday and Saturday (NZT). Don't expect much other than photo opportunities, although with Trump there is always the capacity for something to go badly wrong during or after the meeting. In May, China agreed to buy 200 Boeing jets during Trump’s visit to Beijing but no actual deal has been done so far, so anything announced at these summits doesn't mean anything will actually happen.

In the US they will release durable goods order data and most observers think they will fall in August from July.

From everywhere will be getting PMI updates. And from Taiwan we will get its export order data.

All this, plus whatever happens in the Middle East wars.

Over the weekend we learned that China posted another weak foreign direct investment result for August, down -5.3% on a year-to-date basis. But the incremental flows were tiny in August. up just +US$7 bln from July and virtually unchanged from year ago levels. From two years ago there is a large drop. For all the official propaganda about how well the Chinese economy is doing, it isn't enticing investment in. A key reason these flows are so low is that sovereign wealth funds are now on the sidelines.

Japan's CPI inflation rate held at +1.9% in August as it was in July, and their core inflation rate eased to 1.7%. Both results were at the bottom end of expectations, and should have taken pressure off the Bank of Japan who were meeting as this data was released. But they have other issues weighing on them including defending the yen, and facing bullying pressure from the Trump Administration. All the same, inflation this low when the global price pressure is high is an achievement, even if Japan is only one many Asian economies that are managing to replicate that result.

As universally anticipated and earlier implied, the Bank of Japan delivered its +25 bps rate hike on Friday, taking its policy rate to 1.25% which is a 31 year high. They said they will "continue to raise the policy interest rate and adjust the degree of monetary accommodation, in response to developments in economic activity and prices as well as financial conditions."

Meanwhile, the Bank of Japan made a 'rate check' in currency markets on Friday ahead of their holiday, after the yen fell on the rate hike, and that has strengthened sentiment for the yen, also likely underpinned by geopolitical considerations.

Across the Pacific, US industrial production stalled in August from July, a disappointing result because it rose in July and was expected to rise again in August. It is now +1.4% higher than a year ago, not exactly an indicator of a booming economy although that is up from +1.1% in July. Almost all of this is due to data center buildout ("business equipment" was up +7.1%). In fact, production of consumer goods is now falling at a -1.1% annual rate.

Also disappointing was the US Conference Board leading indicator which edged lower in August when a small rise was anticipated and after a bigger rise was booked in July.

In Europe, the August ECB inflation expectations survey shows them at 3.0% (median) and 5.0% (average). These levels are little-changed from the June and July survey results.

Germany reported their August producer price levels overnight and that came in at +4.6%, higher than July's +3.0% and higher than the expected +4.1% rise. Of course, driving this were energy costs which were up +8.3% from a year ago, up +3.2% from July.

In Australia, after testimony to a parliamentary committee on Friday in which Governor Bullock made a hawkish briefing on inflation risks, economists have suddenly realised that a rate hike is the most likely outcome at the nest monetary policy review there on September 29. That will take their cash rate target up to 4.60%. And it may go higher if inflation isn't restrained at that level.

The RBA isn't angling to save the Aussie housing market. It may well become collateral damage in the fight against rising inflation.

The UST 10yr yield is now just under 5.00%, down -1 bp from Saturday up a net +2 bps for the week. The 30 year yield is at 5.33%, unchanged but down -2 bps for the week. The key 2-10 yield curve is now at +25 bps (down -1 bp). Their 1-5 curve is now at +43 bps (-1 bp) and the 3 mth-10yr curve is at +110 bps (also down -1 bp). The China 10 year bond rate is up an unexpected +4 bps at 1.72%. The Japanese 10 year bond yield is now at 2.98%, unchanged from Saturday to be down -1 bp for the week. The Australian 10 year bond yield starts today at 5.27%, down -2 bps from Saturday but down -12 bps for the week. The NZ Government 10 year bond rate is now at 4.97%, unchanged for a weekly -9 bps retreat.

The price of gold is at US$4383/oz, and just +US$2 from Saturday, down -US$33 from a week ago. Silver is at just over US$66/oz and down -50 USc but up +US$2 from a week ago

Oil prices have held at just under US$100/bbl in the US, while the international Brent price is up +50 USc at US$104/bbl. A week ago these prices were US$100.50/bbl and US$104.50/bbl respectively, so little-changed. Hormuz transits are choked right off today with just three ships exiting over the past 24 hours, no tankers escorted (0 dark with transponders off) and three entering for new loads (0 dark). The Red Sea activity is now only about 15 each way at the Yemen chokepoint in a sudden shift.

The Kiwi dollar is unchanged from Saturday, still at 57.2 USc but down -90 bps from a week ago, down -190 bps from the start of the month. Against the Aussie we are holding at 80.3 AUc. Against the euro we are still at just on 49.8 euro cents. That all means our TWI-5 starts today at just under 60.7, unchanged at a six-week low.

The bitcoin price starts today at US$81,118 and little-changed from Saturday. Volatility over the past 24 hours has been low at just over +/-0.8%.

Daily exchange rates

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Source: CoinDesk

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25 Comments

"The (Oz) economy needs migration and data centres. Voters hate both"

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-09-21/migration-data-centres-economy-a…

 

This quote caught my attention:

"Huawei's Intelligent World 2035 report predicts global data centres could consume about 1.5 trillion kilowatt-hours (kWh), or up to 10 per cent of the world's electricity, driven by a massive surge in AI workloads."

https://www.huawei.com/en/news/2026/9/hc-intelligent-world-2035 

https://www.huawei.com/en/intelligent-world

 

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The thing with AI though is the energy doesn't necessarily need to be well located. In fact somewhere cold and miserable near the poles is ideal. 

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Location isn't the problem.

Displacement of existing, is the problem.

Why the need to skew? 

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Displacement of what? Some water falling down a hill, or some atoms being split?

There must be plenty of sources of electricity in the world that we haven't used due to location (transmission cost and loss) 

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Surprising that got two upticks. 

Can't blame Stanford, either. 

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Government report card: https://www.stuff.co.nz/nz-news/361034859/report-card-did-government-fulfil-its-economic-promises

As expected they did "well" on the easy stuff, like scrapping Labour policies (many of which were good policies IMO). But they failed dismally on the economic stuff, particularly debt (promised 178 bil achieved 232 bil). Even inflation hasn't gone down that much (4.7% to 4.1%)

Basically they borrowed 50 billion, stopped building stuff (like Kainga Ora, ferries, light rail), increased unemployment considerably, and lots of kiwis left for somewhere better. A solid E grade IMO, hard to see how they could have done any worse. A for effort?

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Well if Iran has any firepower in waiting now would be opportune to fire it. Firstly the mid terms are only six weeks distant & President Trump’s ego and bombast are at full inflate. Secondly any such impact while President Xi is on the scene will be expressive to say the least. In a similar vein when Foreign Minister Molotov was visiting Berlin in 1940 he was told Britain was on its knees, defeated to which he noted, hearing the distant thuds of RAF bombs, something like - doesn’t sound like that to me.

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I agree. After the midterms he will have a crack at Iran. They may as well try and force his hand earlier. 

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Why would Iran wish sabotage the GOP at midterms. Currently they are "winning". Any change in US administration could be bad for them. Saw a video on the cost of the war to US. One figure was $3.7b in damage to US middle east assets. Seems they got pounded as they had no defence systems in place to protect those assets. It's not only Trump that's a complete fool.

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Because if the Republican lose control of one or both houses President Trump’s power is not only weakened but the administration made even more chaotic and distracted, as the Democrats mount challenge after challenge and not just concerning the war with Iran. Over the weekend I mentioned how the North Vietnamese Tet offensive in 1968 was sufficient to turn American public opinion entirely negative about the war culminating in President Johnson not seeking re-election. Ok that’s pontificating through a long straw, but an interesting one nonetheless, Trump can’t stand again but in the interim, he still can be embarrassed and weakened.

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"Trump can’t stand again..."

According to the 22nd Amendment to the US Constitution...

...Russia also had that clause in its Constitution until Putin changed it 

 

 

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Exactly, Redcows.

In fact, the more interesting question might be - why on Earth would Iran want Trump removed?

If Tehran had been permitted to hand-pick a team to accelerate the erosion of American power, I'm not entirely sure it could have assembled a more obliging wrecking crew.

Forget sabotage. Give them another microphone.

In a remarkably short period, Washington has managed to burn through enormous quantities of expensive munitions, expose serious weaknesses in its regional military infrastructure, drive up the economic cost of another Middle Eastern war, antagonise large chunks of the planet and simultaneously place still more strain on an already grotesquely indebted US government.

The Pentagon IG estimate is considerably worse than the $3.7B figure you mention. That was lost equipment. The estimate through June 29 was $33.4 billion, including $22.3 billion in expended munitions, and it didn't even include repairing the US bases damaged by Iranian counterattacks. The report also warned about strategic inventory shortfalls and munitions-production bottlenecks.

Brilliant.

Nothing says "indispensable global hegemon" quite like discovering that the people you're bombing can destroy billions of dollars of your equipment while you discover that replacing the missiles you're firing at them isn't quite as easy as ordering another box from Amazon.

And that's only the military balance sheet.

The much bigger asset being squandered is the one America spent the best part of 80 years accumulating - diplomatic capital, institutional credibility and confidence in the financial architecture sitting underneath US power.

And this is where the historical irony becomes literally breathtaking.

America's extraordinary post-war privilege was that its geopolitical power and its financial imbalances could, for an extraordinarily long time, grow together rather than constrain one another.

Earlier empires eventually encountered the rather inconvenient requirement that somebody had to pay for the empire - America acquired something approaching the geopolitical equivalent of an unlimited bar tab.

Because the dollar became the principal reserve, settlement and funding currency, the United States could run persistent external deficits while foreigners recycled a substantial portion of the resulting dollars back into American financial assets. 

Washington could import more than it exported, project military power across the planet, run increasingly large fiscal deficits and issue Treasury securities into the deepest capital market on Earth.

In other words, the scoreboard that would normally have begun constraining a country — debt, fiscal deficits and persistent external deficits — became intertwined with the machinery sustaining American power.

That is an extraordinary historical arrangement.

But it contains an equally extraordinary paradox - the US has spent decades building its mountain of liabilities while simultaneously building the global power that depended upon foreigners continuing to accept those liabilities.

Hence the importance of the twin deficits.

A conventional empire eventually runs short of somebody else's money.

The American system discovered how to persuade much of the world to help finance the very hegemonic structure sitting above it.

And now comes the really 'clever' (sic) bit - having accumulated enormous federal debt and persistent external deficits under the protection of this unique monetary privilege, the USA (AKA United Sanctions of America) increasingly uses access to the dollar system, sanctions, asset freezes, tariffs and financial restrictions as instruments of geopolitical coercion - thereby giving other countries an increasingly obvious strategic reason to reduce their dependence upon that very system.

You couldn't make this shite up.

The privilege ultimately depends upon confidence, yet Washington increasingly behaves as though that confidence were an American natural resource with an infinite reserve life - it isn't.

And this is why Russia, China and Iran don't need to create some perfect formal anti-American alliance. Their strategic interests increasingly overlap in precisely the area that matters - reducing their vulnerability to American military and financial coercion and developing alternative mechanisms for trade, settlement, finance and reserves.

So Washington is simultaneously running up the bill and encouraging its creditors and trading partners to find another restaurant - quite an achievement.

The supreme irony may therefore be that America accumulated a historically extraordinary degree of power partly because the rest of the world was prepared to finance its deficits - and it is now behaving in ways that encourage the rest of the world to construct alternatives to the system that made those deficits sustainable.

As I have mentioned many times on this platform - the dawning of the fact that as long as the RoW was purchasing or holding the hegemony's debt, then in effect, they were financing their own victimhood.

That isn't somebody attacking American hegemony - it is Washington taking a chainsaw to one of its own supporting columns, which brings us back to Iran - why would Tehran desperately want to interfere with the midterms to remove the very people currently doing so much of a bang-up job and strategic heavy lifting for them?

Every additional dollar Washington burns through, every unnecessary enemy it creates, every sanction that encourages alternative settlement architecture, every Treasury security that has to find another buyer, and every diplomatic relationship it damages, pushes the international system further away from the extraordinary arrangement that financed American primacy in the first place.

Iran's cheapest strategic weapon may therefore turn out not to be a missile at all - it may simply be a television set tuned permanently to Washington.

So why not just let the Orange wrecking-ball rip, sit back, and take stock of what must surely rank among history's most extraordinary examples of geopolitical tragic black comedy - a hegemon dismantling the very architecture of power that made it a hegemon in the first place.

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The USA cannot maintain a fleet in the Indian Ocean forever. Trump can play one more card. A devastating series of attacks on infrastructure to try and cripple Iran’s ability to sustain itself, its people. He can then  withdraw with the threat to come back and do it all again to whatever Iran rebuilds. Hardly sophisticated strategy, but what else is he left with in terms of leverage?

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Foxy. Not quite so sure on that given the US has 11 carrier strike groups which its able to rotate as needed. Heavy US attacks on Iranian civil infrastructure already degraded by years of neglect would generate much human misery and thus risk forcing an earlier endpoint than the US would prefer. US planners will also be mindful of the possible need to intervene in Yemen as Saudi Arabia proves itself militarily hopeless. I suspect they'd prefer to wait this out a bit longer.   

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It appears to me that you both (Foxglove & Middleman) are seriously overestimating the hand Washington is holding.

Middleman, the fact that the United States possesses eleven carrier strike groups doesn't mean it has eleven carrier groups available to rotate indefinitely through one increasingly hostile theatre. 

They have maintenance cycles, global commitments and enormous logistical requirements — quite apart from the finite stocks of interceptors and precision munitions they consume.

More importantly, military hardware isn't the same thing as leverage - leverage is the ability to make somebody else do what you want.

The US can certainly destroy things in Iran or Yemen. The question is whether destroying another refinery, power station or bridge produces the political result Washington wants,  or simply generates another retaliation, another billion-dollar bill, another endangered base and another round of escalation.

And look at what is actually happening with the Houthis.

I'm increasingly wary of Washington's presentation of the supposed Oman "understanding". Reuters has sufficiently broad sourcing that I wouldn't claim the meeting itself was invented. But the interesting question is who needed an accommodation with whom?

The Houthis weren't brought to the table after being defeated. They remain armed, control substantial territory and have demonstrated an extraordinary ability to impose costs around the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb.

Then American representatives reportedly met Houthi representatives in Muscat.

Meanwhile MBS has requested direct American intervention against the Houthis, and Washington has been distinctly reluctant to give him the war he wants.

That doesn't look much like an empire overflowing with unused leverage - it looks more like one beginning to ration it.

Foxglove's proposed strategy - smash Iranian civilian infrastructure, withdraw, and threaten to return whenever Iran rebuilds it - also sounds considerably easier from several thousand kilometers away than it would be operationally.

Iran gets a vote - so do the Houthis - so do Iraq's armed groups, and so too does every missile and drone system capable of attacking American bases, logistics hubs, ships and regional allies.

The problem Washington faces isn't whether it can destroy things. Of course it can. The United States retains enormous destructive capacity.

The problem is whether destroying another refinery, power station or bridge produces the political result Washington wants, or merely generates another retaliation, another billion-dollar bill, another requirement for air defense, another endangered base and another round of escalation.

Six months into this war, that distinction should be becoming rather obvious.

The Saudi situation is even more revealing.

The Houthis have just demonstrated an ability to threaten Saudi territory and energy infrastructure while advancing along Yemen's Red Sea coast. MBS has asked Washington for direct military assistance and hasn't received what he wanted. Washington has simultaneously been talking directly to the very people Saudi Arabia wants it to attack.

That is quite an extraordinary reversal of the traditional relationship - isn't this  where MBS ought to be looking extremely carefully at what is happening around him.

There is already considerable speculation that Washington may decide that MBS himself has become expendable. 

Mohammed bin Nayef,  MBS's cousin, predecessor as crown prince and once an exceptionally close American intelligence partner, remains the obvious name whenever discussion turns to an alternative within the House of Saud. MBS removed him from the succession and subsequently detained him.

So MBS would be extraordinarily foolish not to contemplate the possibility that yesterday's indispensable American ally can become tomorrow's inconvenient liability.

There is also a much larger strategic choice confronting Riyadh.

Saudi Arabia can remain tied to a US-Israeli strategy of confrontation with Iran, while simultaneously fighting the Houthis, and discovering that its supposed security guarantor isn't particularly enthusiastic about fighting that war for it.

Or Riyadh can explore what an entirely different regional security architecture might look like, involving Iran, Russia, China and the increasingly important BRICS+ framework rather than assuming American military primacy is permanent.

Russia's potential significance in such a scenario isn't that Putin possesses a magic telephone with which he can simply "order" the Houthis to stop - he doesn't.

It is that Moscow, Beijing and Tehran collectively offer diplomatic channels and economic relationships that Washington simply cannot replicate by dispatching another carrier.

Whether such an accommodation could actually produce a Saudi-Houthi settlement is another question entirely. But compare that possibility with the alternative being suggested here:

Bomb Yemen again - Bomb Iran again - Protect Saudi Arabia - Protect Israel - Protect American bases - Protect the Strait of Hormuz - Protect the Red Sea - Protect Bab el-Mandeb - Keep enough forces available for Europe and the Pacific.

PLUS apparently rotate eleven carrier groups through the whole circus indefinitely - REALLY???

The critical question isn't how much military hardware America owns - it is how many simultaneous commitments that hardware can sustainably support, economically, logistically and politically, against adversaries who have discovered that they don't have to defeat the United States conventionally.

They merely have to make maintaining the empire progressively more expensive than Washington can afford.

And judging by Washington's extraordinary reluctance to give MBS the military intervention he keeps requesting, somebody inside the Pentagon appears to understand that rather better than you guys do do.

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Goodness me Colin, that's a sweepingly wide ranging response to a simple exchange about America's logistical capacity to maintain its naval forces in the gulf and what it may or may not do next. Magisterial even, one might say. 

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Middleman, I don't think the subject under discussion was ever remotely as simple as you suggest.

The issue wasn't merely whether the United States can maintain a particular naval presence, launch another round of strikes, or exert pressure on one country in isolation. The much larger question is how much effective military, financial and political leverage Washington still possesses across the Middle East, and whether the regional architecture built around that leverage remains sustainable.

That necessarily requires looking at the whole chessboard. The Gulf monarchies themselves are relatively small, highly exposed states whose security arrangements have historically depended heavily upon American power. 

At the same time, the region around them is changing: China has become an enormously important trading partner, Russia remains an important strategic actor, Iran retains substantial regional influence, and BRICS+ is creating an alternative framework through which countries can diversify their economic and diplomatic relationships.

So yes, my argument was "sweeping" - because the subject itself is sweeping. What I think is changing is the assumption that Washington can indefinitely impose its preferred regional order through some combination of military force, sanctions, dollar-based financial leverage and security dependency.

If that assumption continues to weaken, the implications extend far beyond Iran or Yemen. They reach directly into the future security arrangements of the Gulf states themselves.

And that is the paradigm shift I was actually talking about - away from a Middle East organised predominantly around American military protection and coercive leverage, and potentially toward a much more multipolar arrangement in which regional states have greater incentive to accommodate one another and deepen economic relationships with China, Russia, India and the wider BRICS+ grouping.

Whether that produces peaceful coexistence is obviously not guaranteed, history gives us no such guarantees. But neither should we assume that maintaining the existing US-dominated security architecture is synonymous with stability.

Looking at the changing facts on the ground isn't avoiding the complexity, Middleman. It is precisely because the situation is complex that the old status-quo assumptions deserve to be questioned.

And because what happens in this region could have enormously destructive consequences for the global economy, particularly for countries such as New Zealand that remain highly exposed to disruptions in energy flows through the region, I have taken the time to study the wider picture at considerable length.

US naval presence is important, certainly. But it is only one aspect of a very large and rapidly changing equation - naval power is one component, the real subject is the changing architecture of power across the entire region.

 

 

 

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There is a significant chance that Trump declares a war before the mid-terms, and suspends them. 

But no matter how the Middle East plays out - from a 'win' for either side or anything in between - the supply of fossil energy won't get back to 2025 levels. Ever. 

With ramifications for all who have laid - and are reliant on - future bets. Even an Obama cannot alter physics. 

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I believe in "free markets'.   But the thing is our various industries, eg supermarket, don't believe in free markets and do everything in their power to extinguish them.

David Seymour has got confused.   He supports the industry  He has become anti free market. 

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U.S. stock markets will begin trading 23 hours a day, 5 days a week from December 6 The planned trading week will run from Sunday evening through Friday evening, with a one-hour daily maintenance break. Nasdaq and NYSE Arca are among the venues preparing for expanded hours, while the regular 9:30 a.m. – 4 p.m. session remains unchanged.

The SEC is upgrading market infrastructure for 23/5 trading, with full 24/7 trading potentially coming later. Brokers will decide which securities and overnight services customers can access, while thinner liquidity could mean wider spreads and greater volatility.

https://www.nasdaq.com/docs/nasdaq-global-trading-hours-faqs

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Corruption continues....and locally.

23 mins

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GA749Mz1REk

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They have a lot to lose and will spend accordingly

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OECD assessments describe Aotearoa as having among the weakest lobbying‑transparency rules in the OECD, with one study ranking it last of 50 major economies for lobbying transparency. Doesn't matter if it's the wokesters or the wingnuts in power.

https://www.wgtn.ac.nz/business/research/researchers/more-featured-rese…

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We need the register AND a stronger media connecting the dots.

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