This is a re-post of an article originally published on pundit.co.nz. It is here with permission.
Last week I explained that the forecasts in the just published Treasury Pre-election Economic and Fiscal Update (PREFU 2023) was similar to the May Budget BEFU, except that it showed weakening in the fiscal position. A summary might be that the commentary on the Treasury forecasts should have happened four months earlier.
What I did not discuss was the PREFU 2023’s medium term outlook which presents the economy returning to track after wobbling last year and this. A serious forecaster always has a medium-term view although there is always a high degree of uncertainty (fan) around it.
I should not be surprised if Treasury is currently reviewing its medium-term outlook. A group of diverse macroeconomists with which I am associated are. Some of their issues are too technical for a column but here is my response to their discussion.
I focus here on the external sector, asking whether there has been some structural change in the last few years. The possibility is there in the PREFU 2023 forecast of the Net International Investment Position (what we owe overseas less what is owed to us) rising from about 50 percent now to near 60 percent in 2027. That suggests that a substantial element of our economic growth in the next few years will be the result of overseas borrowing.
The forecast rising net debt is largely driven by the current account deficit (i.e. import payments over export receipts). Currently they amount to about 8 percent of GDP. The deficit comes down but remains higher than in the decade before 2022, which is the arithmetic cause of the rising net debt. The high current account deficit seems to come from three causes:
First, there is some reduction in our export prices, especially for dairy products. The Treasury forecast expects no significant recovery. This suggests a structural change probably arising from the slowing down of the Chinese economy and their consumption of our food exports. Lower export prices mean lower export revenue, and that increases the current account deficit. It also reduces the prosperity of the farm sector.
Second, while the volume exports of goods has continued to expand, there has been a falloff in service exports, particularly tourist receipts. I have not seen a thorough account of what is happening here so I must be cautious. There are two major possibilities. One is that the post-Covid recovery has not worked through to the tourist sector yet. Rather, after two years of restrictions, Northern Hemisphere tourists are visiting nearby destinations, and when they have exhausted them they will move on to more distant ones. The other possibility is that there has been a structural change in the international tourist industry – perhaps airfares are going to be permanently higher – so our tourist industry is on a lower growth track. Given the importance of the tourist industry’s generation of foreign exchange, the latter scenario would represent a major structural change, as would lower export prices.
The third possible structural change is the fiscal stance. To go back to last week’s PREFU column, the big change seems to be the falloff in corporate tax receipts. PREFU 2023 gives no account of why this has happened and expects the receipts to be back on track in a couple of years. Let’s hope it is right.
Even so, public debt continues to rise faster than GDP. PREFU 2023 expects net public debt (excluding the NZ Superannuation Fund) to be near 40 percent of GDP over the next few years, in contrast to 20 percent or so before COVID, with no expectation of a significant fall.
(There are a number of measures in the PREFU 2023 forecasts. I am not fastening on a single one in the way the election ‘debate’ does but looking at them all. As I said, the issue is technically complicated.)
If the government is borrowing more, then someone has to be lending to it. Generally that ‘someone’ is overseas, although the channel through which the loans flow is complicated. As a rule, the New Zealand Government borrows in New Zealand currency, but further along, the lender to the government is, typically, converting foreign currency into New Zealand dollars. Suppose the public borrowing is used for diesel to fund capital investment. Ultimately, the diesel has to be paid for with foreign currency.
(This is a severe omission in explanations like Modern Monetary Theory when they ignore the foreign sector. The index of Steve Keen’s The New Economics: A Manifesto – which, by the way, is a much better exposition of MMT than his earlier book – does not mention the balance of payments, exports or imports. Were modern economies so simple.)
Forgive me if I don’t give here the details of the complex analysis. What seems to be happening is that we are not adjusting our economic behaviour for the expected reduction in the terms of trade. Over the next four years, consumption and investment are expected to grow more slowly than total production (GDP) – public consumption is actually forecast to decline – but the production is less valuable because imports are more expensive relative to exports, so what we can afford to spend is growing slower than consumption and investment. (PREFU 2023 does not publish sufficient tables to be sure of this.) To maintain our desire for growing national expenditure, we have to borrow more overseas so that foreign debt rises.
The good news is part of that borrowing is for business investment, which is expected to rise faster than consumption, and will, presumably, add to productivity. Even so, it is not obvious that national consumption should be rising quite as fast as expected. A neutral observer, observing that public spending is already constrained might suggest that the restraint should be on private spending, although those with political agendas might argue differently. (Remind me of the economic case for general tax cuts.)
This conclusion is not the outcome I expected when I first began analysing the medium-term PREFU 2023; facts have a bad habit of getting in the way of preconceptions. Ultimately then, PREFU 2023 seems predicated on a structural change in our terms of trade with slower economic growth prospects in the medium term. Oh dear.
*Brian Easton, an independent scholar, is an economist, social statistician, public policy analyst and historian. He was the Listener economic columnist from 1978 to 2014. This is a re-post of an article originally published on pundit.co.nz. It is here with permission.
6 Comments
Another load of garbage from Brian Easton. NZ Dollar Currency can only be issued by the NZ Government via its central bank and it cannot simply be created by converting from another currency and NZ Dollar Currency is created in the first instance through the governments spending before any borrowing can take place and which never finances government spending anyway.
The Reserve Bank has just put another $4 billion of NZ Dollar Currency into the foreign exchange markets and this was simply created by a few key strokes and so why does he think that the government needs to borrow money to finance itself.
He also seems not to know that our banks also create money as credit to finance our economy and so we don't rely on foreign borrowing to finance ourselves. Banks do need to retain this created money though as their deposits but not to lend out.
A bit of confusion here on overseas borrowing - Govt never goes offshore to 'borrow money'. The sequence of events is:
- Govt Spending: RBNZ marks down the Crown Settlement Account and marks up the Settlement Account of the commercial bank providing banking services to a Govt Ministry. The commercial bank then credits the bank account of the Govt Ministry. The Govt Ministry then spends from that account - paying salaries, buying stuff etc
- Govt Debt: The increase to the commercial bank settlement account balance described above immediately increases Govt's debt. Settlement account balances are floating rate Govt debt, with interest payable at OCR. So Govt goes into debt when it credits Ministry bank accounts.
- Govt Bonds Sales: If you have a settlement account at RBNZ you can bid for Bonds at Govt Bond auctions. If you buy a $100M bond at face value, your settlement account is debited by $100M, the Crown Settlement Account is credited with $100M, and you take ownership of a $100M bond paying a given rate of interest. So, a Bond sale is not 'borrowing' - it is a swap of floating rate Govt debt for fixed rate Govt debt (QE is the reverse). Most of the bonds purchased at auction are sold into the secondary market where they are traded freely.
- Importing: When we import $100M of goods or services, this leads to a change in ownership of $100M of NZ dollars. The new owner of those $100M of NZ dollars will typically sell them on (if they are a currency trader) but eventually NZ dollars owned overseas are used to purchase NZ Govt Bonds - and why wouldn't they be? Bonds pay interest and can be used as solid collateral.
The net effect of all of this is that we close our trade deficit by 'exporting' Govt bonds. You can see this clearly over the last few years - cumulative trade deficit of $30bn, increase in non-resident holdings of Govt Bonds of $30bn. So, whilst we run a trade deficit, there will always be NZ dollars owned overseas available to be swapped for interest-earning Govt bonds.
Using Govt bonds to close our trade deficit comes with some risk. For example, if the return on NZ Govt bonds is weak relative to, say, US Fed Bonds, then investors might sell the NZ dollars they own to buy US dollars (to buy US Bonds), or sell NZ Bonds to do the same. This puts downward pressure on the value of the NZD. In effect, therefore, a trade deficit reduces our monetary sovereignty - we basically have to follow the Fed when the raise interest rates.
I think we are seeing a structural shift to continuous and pronounced trade deficits. We are going to be importing a LOT of tech over the coming years, not to mention billions of dollars of carbon offset credits. Our exports are low grade primary goods that will fall out of favour - China are aiming to be timber and dairy self-sufficient by 2035 for example. We will need to work out how we keep our rates high enough to protect our currency value without destroying our domestic economy. The US model of 30-year fixed rate mortgages and targeted investments and low-rate loans (aka industrial policy) looks attractive to me. But, maybe we could also give some thought to how we quickly we can reduce our reliance on imported oil ($12bn per year) and cars ($12bn per year)?
Hey JFoe,
- why do we have to involve the "commercial bank providing banking services"? Yes this approach needs some hard constraints is used when shit hits the fan overseas (internationally the tide is goin out) and ideally used for productive things, or at least for paying off debt.
Agree on the export view - and note that diary is poked before 2030 thanks to dairy alternatives (factories producing non-cow dairy with a brewing process). On the bright side oil and cars should flip by 2025 tipping point when EV's will be cheaper and better than petrol cars. Note the Ozzy is due to reach 100% renewal energy by 2025 - on a good summer day you will be paid to charge your EV!
All money is created as debt and is someones liability and once debt is repaid the money no longer exists. All NZ dollars are created this way as with every other countries money. All of the money that we spend in NZ was created in this country and not overseas and we also pay for our imports by using this money. Money repatriated from overseas does not finance anything and it is just an accounting structure. Our banks don't lend out other peoples money and nor does the government spend other peoples money.
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/working-paper/2018/banks-are-not-interm…
https://www.levyinstitute.org/publications/can-taxes-and-bonds-finance-…
We welcome your comments below. If you are not already registered, please register to comment.
Remember we welcome robust, respectful and insightful debate. We don't welcome abusive or defamatory comments and will de-register those repeatedly making such comments. Our current comment policy is here.