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Banks' low equity mortgage lending is surging, raising the question of how far can it rise before the Reserve Bank gets uncomfortable?

Banking / analysis
Banks' low equity mortgage lending is surging, raising the question of how far can it rise before the Reserve Bank gets uncomfortable?
2012
Banks partying like it's 2012? Westpac NZ advert in Auckland 2012 on left, BNZ 2026 ad on right.

Against the backdrop of a soft housing market, banks' low equity housing lending is surging, both as a percentage of overall new lending, and within the big five home lenders' individual loan books. 

Figures from the major banks latest general disclosure statements show ANZ New Zealand, the country's biggest housing lender, has 9.3%, or almost $11.9 billion, of its total home lending as loans where the borrower has less than 20% equity. That's up from 7.5% a year earlier and 6.2% five years ago.

Kiwibank's low equity, or high loan-to-value ratio (LVR), lending's up to $3.8 billion, or 11.2% of total home lending from 8.6% a year earlier.  And at $8.8 billion, Westpac NZ's is 10.6% of total lending, up from 7.2% five years ago. 

As Greg Ninness has been tracking, low equity mortgage approvals to first home buyers have grown spectacularly over the past four years. In July loans where the borrower had less than a 20% deposit comprised 49% of all loans to first home buyers by number. 

And Reserve Bank new residential mortgage lending data shows during July, $1.261 billion, or 16%, of the total $7.853 billion worth of new lending commitments, was loaned with an LVR above 80%. That's up from 13% in July 2015, and 9% five years ago in July 2021, a time when the housing market was on fire, coinciding with a period when the Reserve Bank had removed LVR restrictions.

Despite this surge in high LVR lending, last month the Reserve Bank said housing risks were contained, therefore it was leaving its LVR restrictions on banks' housing lending unchanged. 

LVR restrictions limit the volume of low equity mortgage lending banks can do. Or from a borrowers' perspective, they restrict the number of borrowers with small deposits that a bank can lend to.

The current LVR restriction rules, in place since December last year, are: For owner-occupiers, allowing up to 25% of a bank's new lending to have an LVR above 80%. For investors, allowing up to 10% of a bank's new lending to have an LVR above 70%. (Some loans are exempt from LVR restrictions, with the details here).

The Reserve Bank's restrictions place no limit on the proportion of the total stock of a bank’s lending that can be high-LVR. Rather, the LVR limits apply to the flow of new lending only. 

"However, over time the flow of new lending becomes the stock of all lending, so the proportion of the stock that is high-LVR is affected by the proportion of new loans that are high-LVR," a Reserve Bank spokesperson says.

Where does the Reserve Bank get uncomfortable?

It's not clear, however, where the ceiling is for the Reserve Bank's tolerance of what percentage of total lending can be low equity lending. We do know that when a Reserve Bank under different leadership first introduced LVR restrictions, high LVR lending had been around 30% of new housing lending flows, and around 20% of total lending stock at the major banks.

With its financial stability hat on, it's hard to believe the Reserve Bank would be comfortable seeing those levels again.

The Reserve Bank decision to maintain the LVR status quo in August came against the backdrop of a weak housing market. The latest Real Estate Institute of New Zealand (REINZ) data shows the national median price was $760,000 in July, down 0.7% year-on-year, and down $165,000, or 18%, from the November 2021 peak of $925,000. Sales volumes fell 10% year-on-year to 6,090, and inventory was up 9% to 33,252. At 50 days, the national median days to sell was up two days year-on-year and was the fifth slowest July on record since REINZ records began in 1992.

Reserve Bank data shows total housing lending of $397.5 billion as of June 30, with lending with an LVR above 80% comprising $39.8 billion, or 10%, of that.

Low equity loans flying out the door

In August 2013, following much speculation and expectation, the Reserve Bank announced LVR restrictions, a tool from its freshly minted macro-prudential toolkit, would be introduced on bank's housing lending from October that year. 

Initially banks were required to restrict new residential mortgage lending at LVRs of over 80% to no more than 10% of the dollar value of their new housing lending flows. In the early days it stayed comfortably below 10% as banks adopted an ultra cautious approach.

That was in stark contrast to prior to the implementation of the LVR restrictions in 2012 and 2013, when some banks had been pumping low equity loans out the door. In August 2013 the percentage of new housing lending flow that was low equity lending was 25%. 

In some quarters during the run up to the introduction of LVR restrictions more than 70% of ASB's net home loan growth came from lending where the borrower had a deposit equivalent to less than 20% of the property's purchase price. At 30 June 2013 ANZ and ASB, the two biggest home lenders, had 21.5% and 22% respectively, of their total home lending as loans with LVRs above 80%.

In 2012, as banks ramped up low equity lending, Westpac had advertisements in Auckland for home loans "from as little as 5% deposit." Fourteen years later BNZ is also advertising getting people into a home with a 5% deposit.

@bnzbank

Go direct to BNZ and you could get into a home faster with a 5% deposit.

♬ original sound - bnzbank

Risks attached

Low equity lending comes with risks to borrowers, lenders and the financial system as a whole. For borrowers negative equity may be a risk because if the value of the property drops a borrower can end up owing more on the loan than what the house is valued at, complicating any sale or loan refinancing. 

 Low equity borrowers may face higher interest rates than borrowers with bigger deposits, and/or extra fees, or margins, banks charge for low equity loans adding significantly to the loan costs. Conversely, low equity lending is more lucrative for the lenders.

Rising interest rates or a borrower losing their job can also ratchet up pressure on the borrower to keep up with repayments. Such a scenario may result in a mortgagee sale by the bank, but a high LVR could mean the sale price doesn't cover the loan's outstanding balance.

As for the financial system, a sudden economic downturn, especially featuring a surge in unemployment, could trigger a range of loan defaults which could be magnified by significant volumes of home owners with a small amount of equity in their home.

 

 

Lessons from the GFC

The Reserve Bank has required banks to disclose their LVRs on residential mortgage lending since March 2008. That was during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), when high-risk subprime mortgage lending and complicated financial products such as Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs) crashed the US housing market with international ramifications.

Banks, real estate agents, then-Prime Minister John Key and ex-Reserve Bank Governor Alan Bollard, weren't enthusiastic about LVR restrictions. Critics said borrowers would find ways around them, turn to finance companies, or they would lock first home buyers out of the housing market. Despite this, the Reserve Bank, whose Governor at the time Graeme Wheeler had witnessed the US housing market crash of 2008-10 whilst living there, pushed ahead.

Wheeler and the Reserve Bank wanted LVR restrictions to; help slow the rate of housing-related bank credit growth, help slow house price inflation especially in Auckland, reduce the risk of a substantial fall in house prices, and give the Reserve Bank more flexibility around the timing and size of any Official Cash Rate increases.

LVR restrictions remained in place until the Covid-19 pandemic, when they were removed completely from May 1, 2020. The Reserve Bank said it would do this for 12 months to encourage banks to keep supporting credit-worthy borrowers during extraordinary times. 

However, with a Covid-era cocktail in place of historically low interest rates, job security through the Government's Wage Subsidy Scheme, a mortgage deferral scheme, enthusiasm from lenders to shovel money out the door, plus media stories and real estate agents inducing FOMO, or the fear of missing out, New Zealanders plunged into mortgage debt boots and all during 2020 and 2021. The value of new mortgages taken out during that period reached an annual rate of about $100 billion.

Thus LVR restrictions were reintroduced from March 2021 and have remained in place since.

Here to stay

When LVR restrictions were first introduced Wheeler said how long they'd be in place depended on how effective they were at restraining housing lending growth and house price inflation. They would be removed; "if there is evidence of a better balance in the housing market and we are confident that their removal would not lead to a resurgence of housing credit and demand," he said.

As it turned out, it took a global pandemic and fears of economic catastrophe for them to be removed. And even then it was only for 10 months as house price inflation topped 15% by the end of 2020, pushed towards 30% in 2021, and property investors filled their boots with high-LVR loans. 

This led to the Reserve Bank acknowledging in 2023 that; "in uncertain situations there may be value in waiting before removing restrictions." And; "alternatively, [in future] more measured adjustments could be taken such as easing LVR restrictions rather than removing them altogether."

That suggests, barring some massive catastrophe, restrictions on banks' low equity lending are here to stay. And even in a catastrophe, removing them may prove temporary. 

Additionally the Reserve Bank now has debt-to-income (DTI) restrictions, capping the amount of money borrowers can take on relative to their income, in its toolkit. Thus should the housing market go on a tear, DTIs could be ramped up in tandem with LVR restrictions.

                       2026                      2025                       2021
 

High LVR loans

% of total loans

High LVR loans

% of total loans

High LVR loans

% of total loans

ANZ

$11.9b

9.3%

$9.1b

7.5%

$6.4b

6.2%

ASB

$8.1b

8.5%

$6.9b

7.7%

$6.1b

7.8%

BNZ

$4.8b

6.9%

$4b

6%

$3.9b

7.3%

Kiwibank

$3.8b

11.2%

$2.7b

8.6%

$2.1b

8.7%

Westpac

$8.8b

10.6%

$7.1b

9%

$4.8b

7.2%

*ANZ, BNZ and Westpac figures as at March 31 in relevant year, ASB and Kiwibank as at June 30.

*This article was first published in our email for paying subscribers early on Friday morning. See here for more details and how to subscribe.

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10 Comments

If Banks actually marked their asset security at its true market value, there would be ever greater low equity loans. Aka negative leverage. This would still be true even if they stopped new loan lending.

There would also be greater no/negative equity loans... 

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5

I've said many times: whats required is legislation/regulation for no recourse mortgages as USA. The only effective constraint to moderate excessive bank lending practices is requiring them to have their own skin in the game. 

Why this hasn't been done since the 2021 "greed is good" shambles is a good question - my answer might be considered libelous.

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8

There are two parties in any loan, the bank and also the customer.  Why is the common reaction to always make the business responsible for trying to sell their goods, and never the customer for buying the product or service?  I'm not in favour of a nanny state that "protects" everyone against bad decisions.  If one person out of a one hundred does something stupid and the government introduces a new, restrictive, and costly law to protect that one person, the other 99 are paying the price.  I prefer freedom and personal responsibility.

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2

I'm usually all for personal responsibility  (cf. my comment history on this site) however this is not an equal player game. It's fraught with asymmetric information and advantage.

It's also not the same as buying a toaster or a car. I know a few people who've lost a lifetime of hard earned savings in the last 5 years & are locked into a house with no way out short of bankruptcy. Life changing & not in a good way.

I'm unsure how no recourse mortgages would result in "others paying the price"? I'd expect the main effect would be to promote more conservative lending criteria & perhap suppress prices (ceteris paribus). 

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6

Low equity loans in a dropping market is a recipe for disaster.  I suppose without these low equity loans, banks are not able to expand their books.

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4

for numbers imagine hosuing is 100k and people have 10k bingo house

if the rbnz made them put in 20% they have 10 can only borrow another 40k

houses fall to 50k   banks do not want this to happen

for banks low equity lending provides housing market liquidity...   without them the market has a much lower floor.

 

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5

for banks low equity lending provides housing market liquidity...   without them the market has a much lower floor.

Yes, And look at the Aussie Govt 5% Deposit Scheme. Obviously different to central bank regulation, but it improves a bank’s credit-risk position. It has a liquidity benefit in that it supports mortgage origination and makes those loans somewhat easier to fund or manage as lower-risk assets while indirectly supporting demand - the ultimate goal is to entice demand in to the Ponzi. Not as benevolent as it's promoted to be. It's also about taking care of the mates. 

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1

My possibly simplistic view is that banks capacity to enter into low equity mortgages on property should be further constrained. 

There are 3 parts to my thinking. 

First, my home is not a commodity, it is an essential for shelter. It is worth what it is worth in $ terms but is not an inherent wealth generating item. Since the liberalising of banks ability to finance residential property, banks have facilitated commodification. IMO it is irresponsible of banks to facilitate lenders into a vulnerable, low equity, financial position. Yes they stress test but that is only guessing at the future. Those stress tests assume some variability in interest rates and income generation for the lender but do not assume the loss of major income for the borrower. And we all know that s**t happens in life, often at the worst time. In advancing funds on low equity, I argue the bank is acting in it's own self interest, rather than the borrower's interests. Risk premiums and insurance premiums (conditions of borrowing) all add to the revenue stream for the bank. And I suspect it is difficult to change banks when equity level is low, so the borrower is a trapped cash cow for the lender. And where do most of the prominent economists, quoted in media in regard to the NZ economy work? In those very same banks. Their primary master is their employer. 

The second part is table mortgages. Unless the borrower is able to make additional principal repayments, they are trapped for a significant period, paying interest in advance with virtually no growth in their equity position. Such lending allows the borrower to notionally own the roof over their head. But it inhibits principal repayment and thereby constrains borrower future freedoms of choices when life circumstances change. If minimum equity was set at 20%, the borrower would have more freedom. Perhaps the capacity to structure the mortgage as a reducing mortgage whereby from day 1 they are growing equity by repaying principal and paying interest only on the remaining principal outstanding. My understanding is that these are hard to come by now because they don't entrap the borrower to the same degree and are less of a cash cow for the bank.

The third is bank embeddedness in the residential real estate sector. It is in the bank's self interest for property sales to occur. By offering low equity lending, banks are arguably pushing up or propping up property values. A $50,000, 20% deposit allows a purchase price of $250,000. If that $50,000 is a 5% deposit, then purchase price can be $1,000,000. Not only does that give the bank a greater interest revenue on the lending extended; it also ensures that property values don't crash back to affordable (by the borrower) levels. If that were to happen, the bank's exposure to loan losses would be greatly increased. After all, their deliberate facilitation of FOMO and low equity lending at artificially low interest rates (that arguably drove a substantial part of recent extreme property value growth) would be put at risk with potentially big losses to shareholders. 

So, no  banks are not like any other main street business selling beds, toasters or whatever. They are parasitic in purpose and action. And unlike the protections consumers have under consumer rights legislation where if the product is faulty or doesn't deliver as advertised, lenders cannot go back to the bank and seek repair or refund in full.

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2

First, my home is not a commodity, it is an essential for shelter.

What you mean to say is that housing is a consumption good, not necessarily a proxy for savings, a store of value, or a speculative instrument.

But if you build your economy on Ponzinomics, you can't really have housing as consumption good. It kneecaps banks' growth potential and undermines the capital base of much of the private sector (SMEs). 

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0

Consumption good, I suppose. Same status as food, water and oxygen.

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0